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1. Introduction 
 
This paper deals with the presupposed conflict of interests between employers and employees 
resulting from a decoupling of operating hours and working times. It starts from the notion 
that both long operating hours and flexibility are relative concepts. As there is some 
discretion, the ultimate choice may differ between countries, sectors of activity as well as 
establishments. Section 2 addresses the various ways a flexible and efficient production 
system can be established and the core determinants of the chosen mix. Section 3 looks into 
the win-win situations. The micro and macro economic consequences of the various mixes of 
flexibility are addressed in Section 4. Central here is the question whether there is a superior 
system of flexibility. It is concluded that both the development and the use of the various 
working time arrangements differ between EU Member States. Apart from the business cycle 
and the production technique, institutional and cultural factors play an important role. Some 
flexibility mixes may be conflicting management strategies, e.g. employability and external 
numerical flexibility. Compensation within labour contracts is mainly a theoretical solution. 
Feasible win-win outcomes concern flexibility from the core workers: internal functional 
flexibility and flexi-year labour contracts. There are business-economic limits to flexibility. 
Moreover, micro and macro level flexibility and efficiency may conflict. There is no single peak 
mix of duration of operating hours and working time options. 
  
 
2. Flexibilisation versus individualisation? 
 
Individualisation concerns the strive of people to match employment, time and income on 
their personal preferences and circumstances. Flexibility can be defined as the degree to 
which an organisation is capable of continually adapting the deployment of people and 
resources to the ever-changing demands of the environment and the difference in work 
processes. This definition covers the technical-economical flexibility (production system), the 
financial flexibility (for instance profit sharing, piece-rate payment and wage flexibility) 
(means) and the social or staff flexibility (people). These forms of flexibility are interrelated. 
For instance, a flexible production system may be a substitute for a flexible employment 
system, and create employment security. Due to shorter terms of delivery, industrial firms have 
to concentrate production on the desired moments (just-in-time production), implying that firms 
are confronted with more variation in busy and slack times, maintenance outside the production 
time, and a more optimal use of the capital goods is becoming more necessary. These 
developments express the shift from product towards order driven production systems. New 
technology will make work less physical and more service like. In the new Service Economy, 
service functions are predominant in all types of productive activities in the secondary, industrial 
as well as the primary, agricultural sector. The development of technology and the consequent 
changes in the production process, produced great development of service functions at all phases 
of transformation processes. The pure production costs have continued to decrease. Moreover, 
there is a growth of industrialisation within the tertiary sector. Modern technology has forced the 
tertiary sector to make radical changes to some of its functioning modes through the introduction 
of processes which are very close to the capital intensive processes in manufacturing (see Giarini 
and Stahel, 1993). 
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Apart from the phase of the business cycle, the production technique and the structural 
business environment, institutions and culture are core determinants of efficiency, i.e. cost-
effectiveness and productivity, as well as the choice how to achieve the desired flexibility 
(mix of duration and flexibility of operating time, labour contract structure and working time 
options). Longer operating time relative to competitors ceteris paribus reduces unit costs and 
hence increases competitiveness. The expansion of operating hours goes hand in hand with 
uncertainty: cost effectiveness of this decision depends on the behaviour of the competitors and 
the business cycle situation. Hence long operating hours is mainly a relative concept. The 
balance between duration and flexibility of operating hours depends on the level and the share 
of the fixed costs and the unit variable costs. 
 
Figure 1: Forms of flexible labour input 
 
 
The human resource management (HRM) has various options available to react and adapt to 
structural changes and volatile conditions (see Figure 1). The desired flexibility for coping 
with the fluctuations in sales can be realised by the incumbent workers. The firm can choose 
to change the work schedules of current employees, for instance by changing full-time jobs to 
part-time jobs, by introducing shorter working hours, variable shifts, overtime, yearly hour 
systems et cetera (internal numerical flexibility). The firm can also change the quality or 
function of the incumbent personnel. The staff’s flexibility is increased mainly by task 
widening (new tasks of equal level), task enrichment (additional higher level tasks) and job 
rotation. Changes in the required skills are achieved mainly by retraining and extra training. 
This mainly concerns the employees’ multiple deployability and their capabilities to switch to 
other jobs and functions (internal functional flexibility). In this case, both the employer and 
the employee invest in the labour relation. A wider term closely related to this is  
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employability. Employability refers to the lasting deployment of employees, or their capacity 
to obtain and keep jobs. This permanent employability holds both for the internal labour 
market within an organisation (internal employability) and for the external labour market 
(external employability). 
 Firms can also use the external labour market to cope with fluctuations in the production. 
The most frequently employed method to adjust to production or service changes is the 
deployment of extra labour, for instance through extra permanent staff, part-time staff, 
employees with fixed-term contracts, agency staff or staff on call (external numerical 
flexibility). The reasoning in this case is that traditional labour costs form a fixed cost factor, 
which considerably hampers the freedom of action available to adjust to changing 
circumstances. The external numerical strategy also refers to downsizing, back-to-the core, 
and lay-offs. Besides, there is external functional flexibility. This externalisation consists of 
(among others) outsourcing, posting, freelance work and subcontracting. In this case, 
employment contracts between employer and employee are replaced by a commercial 
contract. For instance, employers can obtain certain goods or services from outside 
contractors instead of having their own staff provide these. In this way, part of the risk is 
shifted to the suppliers. 
 The various forms of flexibility are to a certain degree substitutes, i.e. functional 
equivalents. The desire to extend operating hours and to make working hours more flexible is often 
preceded by a period of working much overtime. The introduction of reversible shifts may be a 
substitute for the expansion of the capital equipment. Working time reduction and short-time 
are alternatives for lay-offs and down sizing (dismissal). Also temporary jobs and outsourcing 
are substitutes. Subcontracting and back-to-the-core on the other hand are complementary. 
The firm can trade-off hours for workers. It can buy fewer hours from each worker and 
employ more of them, or it can employ fewer workers and induce each of them to work 
longer by paying overtime premiums. Also numerical and functional flexibility can be view 
substitutes. Part-time employment enables the employer to vary the number of hours worked, 
and temporary employment enables them to vary the number of personnel employed or 
engaged. A part-time work force extends the organisation's flexibility to meet fluctuations in 
work demand without hiring employees on fixed-term contracts or agency workers who may 
be unfamiliar with the job, or to extending hours of overtime, which are costly to the 
organisation and exhausting for full-time employees. 
 On average, in all European Union (EU) countries working irregular hours is on the 
increase. However, specific types of working times deviate from this pattern between 
countries. Not only the development, also the use of different working time arrangements vary 
between  the EU countries (Seifert, 1999). Dutch experience shows that longer shop opening 
hours is not costs effective, redistributes employment between firms within sectors (from 
dependent to independent and from small to large establishments) and reduces the quality of 
employment (Delsen, 1999a). Hence, micro level efficiency may not imply or even conflict 
with macro efficiency. Also the proportion of temporary jobs and part-time jobs in total 
employment has been increasing steadily year after year in virtually all EU Member States since 
the late 1980s (see Delsen, 1995, 1998; 1999b). In Europe, the structural increase in the use of 
external flexibility is mainly the result of changes in legislation, the growth of the service 
sector, but most of all the changing management style. However, also supply-side factors play 
a role, e.g. related to part-time employment. 
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3. Positive sum game 
 
Flexibility may not only be of interest to the employer, but also to the employee. I mention four 
examples of win-win outcomes. Internal functional flexibility implies that idleness is prevented 
and extra capacity is available. Internal mobility is improved and employees’ knowledge and 
skills are kept up-to-date The functional flexible employee is multi-deployable and runs less 
risk to be fire. More job security and more variation in work is offered. 
 Until now little or no attention is paid to the possibility of a trade-off between security and 
other working conditions within labour contracts, contrary to the present policy between 
contracts. Labour contracts may be offered with relatively high remuneration or good working 
conditions and with relatively low security i.e. protection against dismissal, and others within 
which lower wages in exchange for more security tailored to the diversity of preferences of em-
ployees (Delsen, 1995). Recent German research (Hagen, 2001) shows no evidence for a 
compensating wage differential for temporary workers. 
 Numerical flexibility may be obtained from the core workers: minimum-maximum contracts 
and working year contracts. Meeting fluctuating production demands solely with core 
employees would be expensive; e.g. overstaffing during normal periods, paying overtime 
premiums, speeding up the pace of production temporarily, maintaining an internal pool of 
workers. Part-time employees might work on a minimum-maximum contract or full-time 
employees work a flexible number of hours per day. The success of such an approach depends 
on the work schedule preferences of core employees. The ultimate level of labour flexibility is 
the flexi-year. Managers in Europe favour such a system whereby the annual number of 
working hours is fixed, but an enterprise would be free (within certain limits) to vary the num-
ber of hours actually worked; wages would remain constant and independent of the hours 
actually worked during a particular period, while overtime would no longer be paid but would 
be offset by fewer working hours at a later date. The loss of overtime pay may be an important 
reason why incumbent workers oppose the flexi-year contract. Over the past decades trade 
unions in Europe have traded working time reduction for flexibility. Flexibility has been the 
major quid pro quo required and obtained by European employers for working time reduction. 
This suggests a win-win situation. Working time reduction seems a social act. However, the 
reduction of working hours may result in the working hours which (from an individual’s 
perspective) are shorter than the optimum number. In return for shorter working hours 
irregular working hours are introduced. From the individual perspective also the temporal 
flexibility may be sub-optimal. Both cases seem a matter of preferences. Why speak of 
unsocial hours? Active time management will imply time flexibility both on the working hours 
side of the employees and on the business hours side of the working places. More emphasis on 
time management in connection with manpower planning in the enterprises may contribute to 
obtaining an optimum workforce mix within an enterprise. Moreover, the model of the working 
year contract is better suited for changes in the life-pattern - education, work in gainful employ-
ment, retirement. The distinction between educational and recreational leave is of importance in 
this respect. The desired changes in the volume and structure of the workforce's contracts to 
reach this optimum depend on the specific nature of the supply of labour or fluctuations in the 
workload. Hence, every enterprise has its own typical optimum workforce mix. 
 In the current turbulent environment, individual employees are expected to take more 
responsibilities with regard to their own professional development. An active career 
management directed towards lifelong employability is increasingly considered a necessity. 
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Employability is seen as a reply to the increasing uncertainty caused by the degradation of the 
social security system, internal flexibilisation and the increasingly businesslike relation 
between employer and employee. The only real security is on the side of the employee him- 
or herself. Employees must take their career planning into their own hands, to be less 
dependent on other people’s caprice. Employability is presented by policy makers (life-time 
employability) as the new certainty to replace the supposedly outdated life-time employment. 
It may be argued that there is a trade-off – a negative relationship – between external 
flexibility and employability. External flexibility and employability are conflicting 
management strategies. Life-time employment can engender high levels of trust and co-
operation between manager and worker, easing the process of change and adjustment: "Flexible 
rigidities" are the result. Efficiency losses may result from limitation on the allocation of 
production factors by the employer. Productivity increase may result from a reduction in 
turnover, an increase in motivation and commitment and an extension of on-the-job training. 
There is a trade-off between macro rigidity and micro flexibility. The necessity and opportunity 
of switching to diversified quality production are greater in economies marked by these institu-
tional rigidities. 
 
 
4. Consequences for efficiency 
 
Flexibility has business-economical limits. The collective labour agreement “à la carte” lends 
shape to the individualisation, to tailor-made employment conditions. It enables employees to 
vary their employment conditions according their personal situation. However, also higher 
engagement, administrative, monitoring, negotiating and maintenance costs occur. Less 
standardisation has a hidden price tag that has to be paid. Producers not only have to take into 
account the production costs of goods and services, including distribution and marketing, but 
also the increasing transaction costs resulting from customisation. The latter are the costs 
related to contracts, as well as the search costs for suppliers and customers on the product 
markets and suppliers on the labour markets. The existence of transaction costs is linked to the 
fact that contracts are “incomplete”. In a neo-classic economy characterised by perfect 
markets and complete labour contracts firms do not have to worry about how to motivate their 
employees. In reality incomplete contracts – certainly in the labour market – are the rule 
rather than an exception, and mutual trust between employers and employees is an important 
source for motivation and commitment. This results in rigidities, but may also be considered a 
“invisible handshake” that is profitable for both employee and employer. 
 Within a firm, the divergence between (individual) working hours and operating hours or 
day, week of per year increasingly makes demands on the logistic and organisational 
procedures. More attention has to be paid to the information and communication systems within 
the firm. For instance, more rosters and time tables are needed; opportunities for job rotation 
have to be created or increased, part-time jobs are introduced or extended; also more time is 
needed to transfer duties and employees are expected to work on irregular days and times, for 
instance working on Saturday and/or Sunday, mini-shifts, compressed working week or shift 
work. So, the ratio between operating time and working time (o/w-ratio) indicates the extend to 
which organisational, communication and logistic procedures are needed. 
 Corporatism is associated with co-operative labour relations and decentralisation with 
antagonistic relations. Firms in countries with decentralised wage setting spend more 
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resources on disciplining activities than do firms in more centralised economies. The 
maintenance costs of regulation in decentralised Anglo-Saxon countries can be expected to be 
higher than in the more centralised Rhineland countries. These higher transaction costs are 
expressed, for example, in a higher intensity of supervision, the ratio of supervising personnel 
to staff carrying out the work. In the United States (17.6 percent) and the United Kingdom 
(15.4 percent), this ratio is three to four times higher than in Belgium (5.5 percent), the 
Netherlands (4.5 percent), Germany (4.4 percent) and Sweden (4.0 percent) (see Gordon 
1994). The higher transaction costs are also shown by the lawyer density, the number of 
lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants and the expenditure on legal services expresses the 
transaction costs (Van Waarden 2001). In the United States (312) the lawyer density is nine 
times that of the Netherlands (35). By comparison lawyer density ratios of some other 
European countries were: West Germany 190, Britain 134, Italy 81 and France 49. 
Expenditure on the legal services in the United States has been estimated to 2.4 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP). In Germany, Britain, France and Italy the lawyering costs 
amounted to 0.5 to 0.6 percent of GDP, in the Netherlands it is not even 0.1 percent. 
 According to the technical annex of the EUCOWE project, long and flexible operating 
hours are key indicators of economic performance of a single enterprise, a company, a sector 
within or between national economies. The view that short working or operating hours go 
hand in hand with poor growth and employment performance does not hold (Seifert, 1999). 
From a social point of view, efficiency only improves if GDP increases thanks to investment 
in more effective machines, a better-educated labour force, improved organisation of 
production or due to a rise in the employment of people who were previously excluded. A rise 
in labour productivity enables one to opt for a greater income. If this is the case, GDP also 
increases. Increased efficiency can also be “converted” into shorter working hours and 
therefore additional leisure time or less intensive labour. In the last two cases, GDP does not 
increase. A country with a low level of labour productivity may be economically richer than a 
country with a high level of labour productivity, particularly if the level of productivity per 
hour is high (Delsen, 2002). Flexibility and not duration of operating hours seems the core 
factor! Related to employment a distinction has to be made between hours, time, persons and 
effort. Also other research shows that there is no single peak set of capitalist institutions, i.e. 
there is no one superior economic system or country. The link between institutions and outcomes 
is subject to a particular world economic environment. Neither the Anglo-Saxon model nor the 
Rhineland model is dominant every time and everywhere (Delsen and De Jong, 1998; Freeman, 
2000). 
 
 
5. Conclusions and EUCOWE relevance 
 
The central objective of the EUCOWE project is the collection and the analysis of 
comparative and representative survey data on the relationship between operating hours and 
working time management and their consequences for employment. The structural changes in 
the business environment - steeper global competition and increased customer orientation – 
render flexibility and duration of operating hours more important. There also are autonomous 
technological and demographic developments that dictate the external business environment 
and explain the shift from stake holder to share holder capitalism, i.e. the change in 
management style, and hence the relationship between operating time and work organization 
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and employment. Notably the technological developments (ICT) have an impact on the 
desired innovation and qualifications, but also on the flexibility of the production process.  
The projects start from three hypothesis: long and flexible operating hours do not exclude 
each other; refer to each other, and have a positive influence on employment. Micro and 
macro efficiency may conflict. 
 The construction of types of enterprises in the technical annex to the project is based op 
operating hours. This suggests a dominant factor and probably a causal relationship? Also the 
fact that working time options are considered instruments of decoupling point towards 
operating hours being the target variable in the flexibility management of the firm? What is 
the central target variable of the EUCOWE project? It also suggests that management is the 
dominant actor. Supply side factors and institutional and cultural factors are not taken into 
account. The present disconnection of working time and operating hours is very much the result 
op collective working time reduction and the annualisation of working time agreed by the social 
partners (European Directive of 1993 on the organisation of working time) and part-time 
employment (European Directive of 1997), and is amplified by the business upswing after  
1994. 
 Types of flexibility management will be constructed, including the need for qualification 
and technical innovation. Socially (un)sound operating hours management is a moving target. 
Internal development of employment and growth are of importance. This also holds for the 
relationship between operating time and working time options and employment. In the 
primary data collection a distinction has to be made between the structural relationship between 
operating hours and working time and employment, and deviations from this trend. The trend in 
operating time has to be established. This has implication for the number of historical years to 
be included in the questionnaire, i.e. to allow for correction of the business cycles. 
 The mix of duration and flexibility of operating time, labour contract structure and 
working time and the resulting employment level and structure at establishment level are 
determined by the phase of the business cycle, the sector specific production technique and 
the structural business environment, national institutions and culture. The collected data 
should allow to differentiate between sectors and between countries as well as time series 
analysis.  
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